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Institutions of Environmental Democracy and Environmental Justice: The Case of Chile
Introduction
As a comparativist, searching for a framework for “comparative environmental politics”
(as opposed to policy), I began studying the three “Principle 10 (P10)” environmental access
rights (also known as the pillars of environmental democracy) i, first promulgated in the 1992 Rio
Declaration. Since the late 1990s, these P10 rights, “access to environmental information,”
“access to participation,” and, “access to justice in environmental matters,” are globally seen as
promoting transparent, inclusive, and accountable governance. Their greatest adoption success to
date is the European Union’s (EU) 1998 Aarhus Convention, which the EU saw as a way to
deepen democracy and sustainability, especially in new Central and Eastern member states.
Now, the push for environmental access rights worldwide is being promoted by several UNrelated agencies, including the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC). The have been working since 2012 on promoting a regionwide Convention for Latin
America and the Caribbean, along with The Access Initiative (TAI), a transnational network of
civil society groups. I argue these access rights can be seen seem to be an institutional basis for
promoting environmental democracy and justice as well as providing a framework for a subfield
of comparative environmental politics.
Studying the adoption and implementation of these rights through concrete institutions in
Latin America is complex, given that it is a region marked, throughout its history, by power
differentials and inequities, especially regarding conflicts over exploitation of and benefits from
natural resources. It is not surprising then that in Latin America, environmental justice has
become and integrating and mobilizing concept connecting environmental, social, ethical and
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political dimensions of sustainability and development. This concept helps researchers analyze
the distribution and types of conflicts in the region that often puts the burdens of development
impacts on the poorest, most discriminated against, and excluded areas and populations
(Carothers 2008; Rasmussen and Pinho, 2016). In a larger project, I am comparing Mexico and
Chile’s adoption and implementation of environmental access rights to pursue justice, as well as
recent attempts to negotiate a Principle 10 Convention for the entire Latin American and
Caribbean Region. This specific paper focuses on the case of Chile.
I am interested in formal political institutions and define “P 10 institutions” as concrete
political organizations and rules that states adopt to deploy environmental access rights. More
specifically, for citizens to have the right to public environmental information, a state would
need to have a Freedom of Information Act and often, an agency that provides the requested
information or explains information denials. The most common institution promoting public
participation in environmental matters is a national agency/service that oversees required public
input in Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for large-scale public and private projects.
Finally, access to justice in environmental matters requires at a minimum, citizen standing in
court if the Access Right to Information or Participation are denied by a government. In lieu of
individual citizen suits, environmental NGOs need standing to sue in court, a fact still not
recognized globally. Many countries, including Chile are now adopting specialized
environmental courts or tribunals.
In this paper, I define environmental justice as a procedural concept; this means not only
that citizens live in a country that allows for these three rights but also makes it possible for
relatively equitable employment of these rights by all citizens. For example, if groups of nondominant language speakers need project information or want to participate in an EIA, the state
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must provide materials translated into the group’s language. Or, the cost of requesting
information or gaining technical or legal expertise, should not be burdensome to a group that is
considered minority or low-income. Thus, the literature discussing these three procedural rights
and justice in numerous national settings maintain that not only the distributional dimension of
environmental injustice, i.e. the disproportionate harm faced by the poor and minorities
(Agyeman, Bullard, Evans, 2003) but also the disproportionate abilities of some groups over
others to employ thee access rights (e.g. Foti 2008; Pring and Pring 2016) must be addressed by
governments. In sum, to quote Chile’s Environmental Minister, Pedro Badenier:
Greater and better access to information, to participation, and justice, will result in in
greater legitimacy for each country’s system of environmental management, will help to
anticipate and prevent environmental conflicts,and will facilitate more efficient
management of projects and programs, whether public or private, thus increasing the
level of protection of natural resources. ii

Key Questions and Methods
Key research questions explored in this study are: 1) Why would individual countries (in
this case, Chile) adopt Principle 10 access rights/institutions? 2)Is there an order of adoption?
3)Once adopted, how are the rights/institutions implemented and monitored? 4)How successful
have environmental movements been in deploying these rights. Finally, 5)how do these access
rights/ institutions help deepen democracy and contribute to environmental justice?
I use a qualitative methodology involving semi-structured interviews with numerous
government bureaucrats as well as activists in environmental NGOs in Chile. I have also been
guided, however, by the quantitative measures of the EDI put together by TAI and the World
Resources Institute. Finally, I sketch out briefly in this work (but offer greater detail in the larger
study) how these rights have worked in practice in some of the best known Chilean
environmental justice conflicts. Especially notable conflicts involve large-scale energy/dam
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project (e.g. HydroAysén) or mining projects (e.g. Barick Gold’s Pascua-Lama project). Both
projects were fought on both general environmental grounds and also on grounds of
disproportionate harm to indigenous communities, thus raising basic environmental justice
concerns.
The Three Procedural Access Rights in Depth
Pillar I: Access to Environmental Information
The right to environmental information:
has been characterized as a third wave of environmental governance or “regulation by
revelation.” The first wave of environmental governance tools were command-andcontrol, the second wave, market based mechanisms and this is the third (Florini 1998,
57-58.
To translate Pillar I, “Access to Environmental Information,” into a formal institution, countries
need to adopt a Freedom of Information (FOI) Act. Sweden is considered to be the first country
to enact a Freedom of Information (FOI) law in 1766; iii but in the modern era, the movement for
access to public information began in 1948, in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The United States was the first country to adopt a modern Freedom of Information
regime in 1966 under President Johnson. FOI laws are seen as a way to offer citizens
transparency in government and thereby diminish corruption and enhance legitimacy. Typically,
they encompass two different strategies. The first involves” mandatory disclosure” in which
public or some private entities must provide scheduled data disclosures on what they do. The
second strategy involves citizens themselves taking the initiative to make specific information
requests (Fox and Haight 2010, 137).
The dilemma for governments, however, is that creating the constitutional or legal
provisions of a FOIA, is only the first step. To implement an information act, officials must
resolve several complex issues such as: what information is considered confidential and what
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delivery mechanisms does the government use to provide information to the public?
Governments must insure that the information is systematic, understandable to average citizens,
and produced on a predictable timetable. At a minimum regarding environmental information,
governments should produce State of the Environment Reports and create air and water quality
monitoring systems (Foti 2008, 8).
Another innovation related to “access to environmental information” are what the United
States calls “Toxic Release Inventories (TRIs),” and in most other countries called “Pollutant
Release and Transfer Registries (PRTRs).” iv This instrument first appeared after several
industrial accidents and nuclear plant mishaps in the 1970s along with an evolving sense that
citizens needed information about the risks they were being asked to bear in their communities
(Kraft, Stephan, Abel 2011:31).
In 1986, the United States passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act (EPCRA). With this act, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began
requiring communities to create comprehensive emergency response systems, but it also created
a national inventory of toxic releases that has become a worldwide model. The U.S. TRI
mandates that information be made public by private industrial plants of a certain size that are
releasing these toxins into the surrounding air, water, or as transfers to another site. Rather than
containing a formal government sanctioning process, the TRI requires creating datasets that are
standardized and publicly available, and will allow local communities, researchers, and activists
to track and compare performance of industrial facilities and other businesses. Citizen groups
and the media then can praise corporate leaders and shame laggards. The usefulness of PRTRs
increasing numbers of countries have adopted them, and they also became part of the legallybinding Kiev Protocol of the Aarhus Convention in 2003. Therefore, all European Union
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members must have a PRTR, but the Protocol also incentivizes other countries to create one as
well (www.unece.org).
Additional practices considered important for environmental information access instituted
in the last three decades are to develop Prior Informed Consent or PIC - based programs that now
typically govern trade in pesticides or hazardous waste. A second practice are private ecolabeling schemes as found in forestry, fisheries, and organic food; these have been put in place to
aid environmentally-conscious consumers. A third strategy involves corporate social
responsibility-related voluntary initiatives, such as the Global Reporting Initiative, with private
firms agreeing to report moves towards sustainability (UNITAR 2004; Gupta 2008). Finally,
civil society activists and researchers consider freedom of access to environmental information
(e.g. as in “State of the Environment” reports) essential for measuring national compliance with
the roughly 1,000 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that are now in force
worldwide (Kanie et al. 2013).
By 2014, over 100 countries had adopted FOI laws, but their implementation must be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis to ascertain their actual impact (Worker and De Silva 2014).
In Latin America, both ECLAC and the Organization of American States (OAS) have been
pushing for a FOI laws throughout the region, arguing that access to public information is
essential for transparent, democratic governance. Indeed, the OAS’s support for transparency and
FOI laws started in 1991 first with its Unit, and then its Department for State Modernization and
Governance. It viewed such laws as an essential means of addressing governmental corruption
(Herz 2012). In 2006, the OAS drafted a model FOI Law for the entire region to adopt.
The OAS and other regional and international organizations have understood that
economic and socio-cultural conditions in Latin America pose fundamental challenges to
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achieving an effective socialization of environmental information. As a result, these IGOs and
activists argue that it is crucial for countries to go beyond merely adopting a FOI law but also
develop suitable capabilities and conditions for extending the coverage and reach of current
access to information tools. By the end of 2015, twenty Latin American and Caribbean nations
had adopted some kind of access to information requirement, also with concerns for making the
information widely available (www.freedominfo.org).
Pillar II: Access to Participation in Environmental Matters
After the 1992 Rio Conference, all United Nations summits related to sustainable
development have promoted a model of participatory or bottom - up decisionmaking (Access to
Participation). The oft-repeated argument is that only broad participation of groups will enhance
the democratic legitimacy and public acceptance of decisions (Backstrand 2012). At its most
basic, especially in poor or marginalized communities, access to public participation in
environmental matters means: officials conduct and document meetings on proposed projects in
language appropriate for the local community, participating bears little or no cost for attendees,
and assistance is provided to local communities to understand the technical aspects of the
project.
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are the most widely known instrument for
providing a forum for public input; and again, the United States was the leader. The 1970
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandated that impact assessments would be
required for large-scale projects with potential ecological consequences. A 1972 follow-up act
strove to make the process less adversarial and to allow citizen input at various stages of project
development. A large scholarly literature exists on public participation in bureaucratic reviews
and the EIA process more specifically; however, after almost fifty years of research, authors
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conclude that creating just and effective participation in impact assessments remains “a work in
progress (e.g. Arnstein 1969; Fung 2006; Dietz and Stern 2008).”
One reason for the present study procedural access rights in Latin America and especially
access to participation is that in the last roughly two decades, the region has been the epicenter of
participatory initiatives (Cameron, Hershberg and Sharp 2012). Yet studies specifically on
participation in environmental decisionmaking are rare; and this gap is all the more glaring since
conflicts over natural resource exploitation and the environmental impact of development
projects, more generally, are among the key issues animating Latin American politics at present.
Notably, international and regional organizations have been in the forefront in promoting
environmental participation in Latin America. Perhaps the first example (although not
necessarily promoted as “access to environmental participation,” but a nod towards participation
in marginalized communities) is the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Convention 169 of
1989. This convention, generally characterized as an international human rights/indigenous
rights instrument, needs a special mention is because of its increasing use in Latin America. ILO
169, as it is commonly known, is the first international treaty recognizing the inalienable rights
of indigenous and tribal peoples regarding development of their lands and natural resources. v In
the first two decades of the Twenty-first century, Latin America has experienced a major
commodity boom causing intensified pressure on arable land and natural resources. Major new
investments in agriculture, mining, oil, gas, and timber have impacted and infringed upon
indigenous territories.
As of 2016, twenty-two countries had ratified ILO Convention 169, with fifteen of the
ratifiers coming from Latin America and the Caribbean. The most important feature of ILO 169
has been the requirement of Free, Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) or consulta previa, in Spanish.
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Yet, globally, states have struggled to define and implement this vaguely - worded right, with
perhaps, the most contentious question not fully answered—does prior consultation allow for a
veto over potential projects on which they are being consulted? In sum, “realizing this difficult
but important right will require clear, objective, and effective state presence—often in territories
where the state has effectively been absent (Sabatini 2014, 3).”
Pillar III: Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
Access to justice requires all levels of governments to establish institutions and
procedures involving courts or some other impartial deliberating body to adjudicate individual
and NGO claims of denial of rights to information or participation. The three access rights are
widely viewed as interdependent; and access to justice strengthens the first two rights. In general,
Pillar III reforms, which pose major challenges to national judicial systems, have been slow to be
adopted (Rose-Ackerman and Halpaap 2001).
Access to justice is a vital aspect of accountability since it provides venues for
enforcement of procedural and substantive environmental rights and duties. Access to justice in
the context of environmental decisionmaking can: 1)strengthen freedom of information, 2)allow
citizens to participate meaningfully and appropriately, 3)level the playing field by empowering
the previously unempowered to seek redress in courts and other forums, and 4)increase the
public’s ability to seek redress and remedy for environmental harm (Foti 2008, 37). Obviously,
seeking justice through the judicial branch can only function if the courts are sufficiently free of
political influence.
To begin to give substance to this right, a wide range of individuals and groups must have
legal standing before courts and administrative bodies to participate in environmental cases.
Citizens must have the right of appeal or review by a higher governmental authority or (when
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relevant) to alternate dispute resolution mechanisms. They also must have the right to have
public officials who are independent in matters of implementation, appeals, and oversight.
Finally, governments must provide access environmental justice at a reasonable cost; there
should be no financial barriers to litigation (e.g. UNITAR-UNECE (2004: 49).
Again, the United States has been a model for the spreading norm of “access to justice in
environmental matters.” The 1946 Administrative Procedures Act gave Federal courts a direct
roleto help enforce bureaucratic agency obligations. The public could request that the courts
review agency decisions. Furthermore, the United States provided a global environmental
precedent when the court broadened its notion of “standing to sue” in the Scenic Hudson case of
1965. vi With this case, United States became the first country to recognize legal standing for
groups of citizens suing on behalf of the environment. It also became the springboard for the
modern specialty of environmental law and modern U.S. environmental legislation such as the
1970 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Importantly, the 1970 law not only expanded
citizens’ right to sue on behalf of the environment but also to sue for procedural violations in
formulating environmental impact assessments (Gellers 2011; Foti, 2008, 11.)
Globally “standing to sue in environmental matters,” remains a contentious issue. In
many countries, even in those with a legal “Right to a Healthy Environment,” citizens may have
to prove direct harm by environmental degradation. Jurisdictions vary on whether individuals or
groups can sue in the public interest or whether it is possible to sue for violation of certain
collective rights belonging to, for example, indigenous or tribal groups. These are only the most
common issues in determining “who,” specifically, has the right to sue for justice. Pring and
Pring, in Greening Justice (2009), have compiled the most comprehensive global overview of
“access to justice” institutions and cited about 350 worldwide. Their overall finding is that
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although the world community agreed to provide access to justice at the 1992 Rio Conference,
most citizens still lack access to courts and remedies for environmental complaints.
Turning to Latin America, overall judicial reform has been a part of the two-pronged
push for both democratic consolidation and economic reform in these Third Wave democracies.
Yet, for the most part, the region remains in the early stages of creating an independent judiciary.
Historically, Latin America’s judiciary had been considered the least independent of any region
in the world (Payne et al. 2007, 118- 119). Only in the last twenty-five years that Latin American
courts have started to become central players in many of the region’s political system (Helmke
2004, Hibbink 2007, Brinks 2007). This increasing activism owes to the introduction of recent
notions into the region’s law school curriculum, of the global doctrine that human rights are
central to constitutionalism.
Moving specifically to the emerging varieties of environmental courts and tribunals
appearing around the world, by 2016, Pring and Pring found roughly 1,200 courts or tribunals in
forty-four countries. By 2016, the Latin American and Caribbean region had eleven
environmental courts or tribunals with more in the planning stage (OAS 2015).
Standing to sue on behalf of the environment raises a difficult issue in many judicial
systems. As Pring and Pring (2009) write:
Standing is a non-issue when three things are clear: the plaintiff’s injury, defendant’s
causation, and the court’s ability to provide an effective a n effective remedy. But
environmental harms are seldom so clear (34).

Indeed, it is still uncommon for individuals or groups to sue on behalf of the environment in
Latin America. It helps if the country has a constitutional “right to a healthy environment,”
which some countries do have. It also helps if the country has experienced environmental law
firms. Finally, it helps if countries have Environmental Management tools that incorporate Pillar
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III access rights (and some LAC countries have them), such as: alternative dispute resolution and
other administrative justice mechanisms such as planning councils and specialized bodies with
environmental jurisdiction.
The Environment-Development Nexus in Chile: A Brief Historical Overview
Chile’s economy, like others in Latin America, has been tied to natural resource
exploitation from its founding to the present. It has large deposits of copper, iron ore, nitrates,
precious metals, molybdenum, a major timber industry, and with hydropower as its only
domestic source of energy. Not surprisingly, then, since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990, but
with a continued neoliberal economic orientation, political conflicts are frequently related to
resource extraction. vii More recently, conflicts are also related to the energy-infrastructure
projects, especially dams, required to power the growing economy. An overall environmental
assessment shows that Chile suffers from widespread deforestation, the numerous harmful
effects of strip mining, overfishing, overuse of chemicals in the fruit belt, air pollution from
industrial and vehicle emissions, and water pollution from raw sewage. Furthermore, the country
experiences severe earthquakes, significant volcanic activity, forest fires, and tsunamis, so that
Chilean citizens need a state-of-the-art emergency preparedness system.
It is essential to review Chile’s recent political history to understand why economic
growth has, until recently, greatly outweighed concerns for environmental protection, until quite
recently. To summarize, Chile had a long democratic but elitist tradition; by the mid-twentieth
century, the party system had crystalized into right, center, and left coalitions. Between 1970 and
1973 the leftist coalition was in power headed by the Socialist president, Salvador Allende. Both
internal and external pressures contributed to escalating instability in the 1970-1973 period; and
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on the “other September 1,” President Allende was overthrown by a military junta lead by
General Augusto Pinochet.
The Pinochet regime remade the Chilean economy as a neoliberal model, emulated in
much of Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and parts of Central and Eastern Europe at the
end of the Cold War. Chile’s democratic regime was outlawed for seventeen years, until the
transitional election of 1989. Patricio Aylwin of the Center-left Concertación por la
Democracia (commonly known as Concertación) won that election, and the Concertación kept
winning every election until 2010, when the center-right Alianza took the presidency for four
years (Sehnbruch and Siavelis 2014). In December 2014, Michele Bachelet (who had been
president in the 2006-2010 term), was reelected. She now headed a coalition that had changed its
name to Nueva Mayoría, and included the Communist Party Importantly, since the 1990 return
to democracy, Chile has continued it neoliberal economic path started in the Pinochet era, albeit
in a more moderate form.
The task now is to examine Chilean environmental politics in the contemporary era and
especially the adoption and implementation of procedural access rights, the institutions of
environmental democracy and justice. While the main focus is on the post-1990 period, some
understanding of Chilean environmentalism in earlier decades may be helpful. A small Chilean
environmental movement that first appeared in the 1960s and early 1970s, mirroring the growth
of environmental movements worldwide at this time. Some minor environmental activism
occurred the 1980s during the years of the military junta, but the government’s nearly total
embrace of a neoliberal ideology, “relegated environmentalism to the margins both culturally
and politically (Carruthers, 2001, 351). viii
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Essentially, environmentalists had no voice until the political transition began in the late
1980s. The first significant environmental gathering occurred in 1989 with “The First National
Meeting of Environmental Action organizations,” to prepare for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio.
After the euphoria of the transition to civilian government, the movement soon lost steam,
similar to much of the rest of Chilean social movements (Kurtz 2004).
Perhaps any action towards environmental protection after the Pinochet era would be a
positive change. Eduardo Silva (1997), David Carruthers (2001), and Kathryn Hochstetler
(2012) examined Chilean environmental politics pre- and post - Pinochet; and while all authors
agree that democracy is better for environmental protection, than the military junta, at least Silva
and Carruthers warn that environmental institutions and practices inherited from the authoritarian
era were not simple to overcome. According to Carruthers, environmental policy, institutions,
and participation have continued to be shaped by ominous legacies from history, dictatorship,
and an economic orthodoxy inimical to sustainability (2001, 343). Hochstetler
suggests/concludes that democratization has been “necessary but not sufficient, as a driving force
for environmental protection” in Chile, and throughout the region (2012, 217).
Institutionalizing Environmental Democracy in Chile
In 2016, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) Report
on Chile noted:
During the last decade, Chile has made remarkable progress in strengthening its
environmental institutions and policy framework, as recommended by the 2005 OECD
Environmental Performance Review…. However, the environmental benefits of
institutional reforms are lagging behind; rigorous implementation is needed to tackle
environmental pressures as Chile’s income level continues to catch up with the OECD
average (OECD 2016, 17).

14 | P a g e

What follows is the story of environmental institution-building amid anti-regulatory historical
legacies to explain why this economically high-performing OECD member has been slow in
implementing the environmental institutions of democracy and justice.
As of 1990, the democratically-elected Concertación government moved to create a more
integrated legal and institutional environmental framework. Yet even under this center-left
government, economic growth was by far the privileged policy concern as it hoped to continue as
Latin America’s most successful economy. From 1990-2010, Concertación presidents operated
in a political culture that has prized conflict avoidance in hopes of avoiding an authoritarian
reversal; thus politicians moved slowly in promoting reforms other than those that would
enhance neoliberalism, (Valenzuela and Dammert 2006).
Still the Concertación wanted to begin to improve sustainability policies and established
a bureaucracy in 1990, the Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente (CONAMA) to begin the
task. In 1994, Congress created an overarching legal framework Ley No. 19.300 Ley de Bases
Generales del Medio Ambiente (LBGMA), in 1994, and in this law, CONAMA was given wider
responsibilities. This agency would have a central directorate and decentralized regional
commissions (Comisiones regionals del Medio Ambiente (COREMAS). Now CONAMA would
oversee initiatives in environmental education and research, public participation, environmental
quality standards to preserve flora, fauna, and their habitat, emissions standards, liability for
environmental damage, and an environmental impact assessment system.
Related to creating procedural access rights, the 1994 framework law mandated popular
participation in formulating environmental policy, particularly in terms of Environmental Impact
Assessments (EIAs). Assessing these institutions in the early years of their operation, however,
Carruthers noted at that time, a wide gap remained between the formal legislation and how it was

15 | P a g e

implemented on the ground, including participation in the EIA process (2001, 349). Again,
writing a decade after the democratic transition, Carruthers continues:
…the austere neoliberal state offers chronically limited funding to environmental
institutions whose leaders likewise lack political clout. Government officials concede the
paucity of the most basic environmental infrastructure – scarce water treatment, virtually
no limits on the discharge of pollutants, no limits on toxic pesticides, no certified dumps
for industrial or mining waste, no ‘right-to-know’ laws, and so forth (349).

Eduardo Silva came to a similar conclusion, that at least in the first decade after the
transition, neoliberalism trumped sustainable conservation in Chile’s environmental policy
(1997, 60). Silva drew his conclusions after focusing on Chile’s southern native forests, the
epicenter of an extremely profitable forestry industry and the government’s non-conservation
approach, becoming a growing area of contention.
The Role of Supranational Organizations in Promoting Environmental Democracy in Chile
While NGOs concerned about the environment, public participation or both were beginning to
find their voice, the initial impetus to create and empower environmental institutions came from
external sources, that is, supranational organizations. Certainly these external organizations help
to energize domestic environmental NGOs and social movements. One possible place to start is
in Free Trade agreements (FTAs) that Chile signed with developed countries, given that the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with its accompanying environmental
requirements had become at least an early model for other trade agreements (GAO 2009,
Danemeier 2011, Jinnah 2016) Chile’s first modern Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was with
Canada (1996); and before Chile signed with United States in 2004, it had agreements with
Mexico (1998), the European Union (2002), and South Korea (2004). While these FTAs
contained some environmental obligations for Chile and may have prompted some minor
environmental adjustments, by far, the main driver of Chile’s adopting modern environmental
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governance structures was the country’s desire to join the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Negotiations with the organization occurred throughout
the first presidential term of Michelle Bachelet, and Chile became one of only two Latin
American members in May 2010 (Mexico joined in 1994). ix Finally, while the OECD and other
regional and international governmental organizations were the primary drivers pressuring Chile
to adopt these environmental access reforms, reforms, domestic NGOs and social movements
were quick to made them part of their toolkit.
A )Pillar One: Access to Public Information
During President Bachelet’s first term, Chile created its Transparency and Access to
Public Information law 20.285), which took effect in 2009 (Michener 2009). Here, perhaps the
primary organization pushing for this law was not the OECD but rather the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (IACHR). Its ruling in Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile (2006) focused on the
matter of Chile’s excessive governmental secrecy. Chile had to accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the court since, as an early step in its democratization, it had signed on a State
Party to the Inter- American Court in1990.
Briefly, Claude Reyes was initiated in 1998 and involved several prominent Chilean
NGOs (e.g. Pro-Acceso and Participa) that requested publicly - held information on a proposed
forestry project. The plaintiffs had requested documents from the government’s Foreign
Investment Committee about the Trillium Forestry Company and its proposed Rio Condor
project. The project would have involved major deforestation in Chile’s southernmost Region
XII, but the government felt no need to provide the requested information. In September 2006,
the Inter-American Court found that the state had refused the request without providing any valid
reason for the refusal under Chilean law; and the court ordered the government to adopt specific
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measures to address information requests as well as pay for the plaintiffs’ costs to bring the case.
Unsurprisingly, as a response to the court ruling and her government’s rapidly declining
popularity, President Bachelet announced her support for an Access to Information law in late
2006. More generally, Claude Reyes has had a regionwide impact in promoting national access
to information laws. x
In case the president needed further reasons to support an information law, the Chilean
Constitutional Court decided in Casas Cordero et al. v. The National Customs Service, August 9,
2007, that Chileans had a right of access to information. xi Thus, given the OECD’s requirement
of a FOI law for membership, regional and domestic court rulings, and President Bachelet’s
support, in 2009, the Chilean government created Law 20.285, the Right to Public Information
lawt o be administered by a newly-created Consejo para la Transparencia (Transparency
Council).
The good news for Chile is that the Transparency Council reported that between April
2009-November 2016 it received over 17,500 complaints of denial of public information. In 79%
of cases, the Council either totally or partially agreed with the plaintiff and the plaintiff received
information; in the same period, 262 public officials received financial sanctions. From these
data and from interviews, Chile’s Transparency Council seems to be working fairly well.
Perhaps some of the explanation, and a sign of good faith from the government, is that its first
Commissioner, Juan Pablo Almedo, came out of the NGO community, having headed the group,
Participa.
Yet problems remain. While the law has represented a great step forward in a country
with little history of governmental transparency or accountability, it had weak points. First it
only covers information from the Executive branch; the Legislative and Judicial branches are
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under no transparency obligations. Also significantly, as Delamaza (2014) points out, in Chile,
the bulk of information related to environmental matters (e.g. resource exploitation) is in private
hands and not covered by the transparency law. A second problem under “access to information”
relates to emergency preparedness and community-right-to-know measures. This is a highly
sensitive issue in Chile, a country subject to many natural disasters, especially earthquakes and
tsunamis. This became a serious issue for the outgoing Bachelet administration in 2010 when an
earthquake and major tsunami hit the coast with over 150 killed. The government was blamed for
failing to give adequate tsunami warning (as well as failing to marshal an adequate response to
the resulting devastation). These failures were used against Bachelet as she ran for President
again in 2013. (Sigmund 2014, 146). Finally, Chile has published PRTR reports since the mid2000s, but the OECD suggests that the country collect more and better statistics as required by
international organizations and international conventions (OECD 2016, 28).
Restructuring Chile’s Environmental Governance in 2010
Given Chile’s desire to join the OECD, in addition to creating a FOI law, the Bachelet
administration initiated a comprehensive overhaul of the country’s environmental management.
The result was the 2010 legislation amending the 1994 General Environmental Framework Law
(19.300). The new law (20.417) contained four major institutional reforms. It established for the
first time, 1) a Ministry of the Environment, 2) an inter-agency Council of Ministers for
Sustainability, 3) an Inspectorate or Superintendencia, and 4) an Environmental Evaluation
Service. Finally, the 2010 amendments called for establishing three environmental courts in
Chile. This ultimately happened with another law, 20.600, passed by Congress in 2012.
In addition to proposing policy, the Environmental Ministry oversees distribution of eight
types of environmental information (including data from monitoring activities such as the
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country’s PRTR adopted in 2005; information on international environmental treaties signed by
the government; all domestic environmental laws; State of the Environment reports; and final
decisions of the environmental tribunals). It also coordinates the Council of Ministers and their
regional offices. The Council of Ministers is supposed to balance the country’s need for
environmental protection with the need to promote economic growth. The Environmental
Inspectorate or Superintendencia is charged with overseeing compliance with laws and
regulations, while the Environmental Evaluation Service is tasked with ensuring public
participation in Environmental Impact Studies (EIS) and Environmental Declarations (EIDs).
The three environmental courts exist to ensure access to justice when the other access rights have
been infringed upon.
B} Pillar Two: Access to Public Participation
Any measure that would promote public participation in Chile is sorely needed.
Perceptions of meaningful participatory opportunities are important for bestowing legitimacy for
formal institutions and support for specific policies. xii Although Chileans have experienced a
high degree of political stability in recent decades, citizens are deeply disillusioned with primary
mechanisms (other than elections) to influence policy. The major change regarding participation
in in the 2010 environmental law was that the new, innovative, semi-autonomous, Environmental
Evaluation Service (SEA) would expand the types of projects requiring participation in impact
assessments. While the 1994 law, 19.300, required public participation only in large projects
(EIS), now smaller projects requiring declarations of impact (EID) might also require public
participation if public officials decided it necessary. Furthermore, post-2010, the Environmental
Evaluation Service was now required to take account of public comments and studies, and its
decisions are subject to appeal. Additionally, the Service is required to consider social, economic
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cultural, and geographic characteristics of communities affected by a project and make
participation accessible to vulnerable, geographically isolated, or indigenous communities. xiii
Yet, Chile still has a deficit in terms of facilitating participation in environmental impacts. Legal
scholar, Matias Guiloff Titiun (2015), shows that since the 2010 law’s enactment, the majority of
impact statements are considered declaraciones, which means they do not require citizen
participation project assessment, xiv and the 2016 OECD Report on Chile notes:
The existing provisions for public participation in the EIA process do not ensure adequate
of project alternatives or minimization of potential envtl impacts, which may potentially
lead to environmental and social conflicts (27). xv
Finally, Chile’s experience with and ILO 169, covering participation rights of indigenous
people in development projects, deserves a brief discussion. While ILO 169 was first proposed
in 1989, it took Chile took twenty more years to put in place in 2009. xvi Christopher Sabatini
notes, somewhat counterintuitively, the countries that have made the greatest advances in sorting
out the vagaries of “the right to prior consultation” to date, have not been the ones most
rhetorically committed to indigenous rights (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), but those
most committed to neoliberalism and investor rights (e.g. Chile, Colombia, and Peru) (2014, 3).”
In Chile, by law, the two government agencies that oversee prior consultations are the
National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI) and the Environmental Evaluation
Service (SEA). In theory, CONADI’s task is to provide technical assistance to indigenous
communities (about 1 million Chileans identify with an indigenous ethnic group) while the SEA
remit is to facilitate, more generally, citizen participation in evaluating the environmental
impacts In practice, however, this division of labor has been unclear.
Early in her second administration (2014-2018), President Bachelet pledged to create a
more institutionalized and transparent prior consultation process with indigenous communities.
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Starting around 2000, these communities have shown determined resistance to the government’s
mining and hydropower ventures on their lands. At present, the results on citizen participation
and, more specifically, on indigenous participation in environmental matters remains decidedly
mixed.xvii One key analyst of general trends in Chilean citizen participation (Delamaza 2014)
argues that after the citizen protects starting in 2011, there has some widening of the space for
debate on citizen participation and feels somewhat optimistic that the space will continue to
widen. Still, he would probably agree with Teckler, Bauer and Prieto (2011) and Montoya (2014)
that that indigenous Chileans do not have effective participation rights through either national
legislation or through ILO 169.
C) Pillar Three: Access to Justice
Under Chile’s 2012 law 20.600, Congress authorized creation of three environmental
courts. Such specialized courts have begun to appear around the world in, roughly, the last
quarter century, but are still seen as novel in the pursuit of access to environmental justice.
Interestingly, after passage of the 2010 Environmental law, demands for environmental courts
(seemingly a way to promote both procedural and substantive environmental justice) actually
were initiated by the exceptionally powerful business community. Business leaders wanted to
have a way to litigate potentially burdensome environmental regulations.
The three courts were designated for Antofagasta, Santiago, and Valdivia; but they are
meant to cover all of Chile. As of this writing (April 2017), only the Santiago and Valdivia were
operating. Each court is to have three judges appointed by the President, along with Senate
approval. The Court is comrised of both lawyers and scientific experts (common in these kinds
of courts, e.g. Pring and Pring 2009); but a major innovation in Chile is use of amicus curiae
briefs in proceedings (Ferrada Bórquez 2015). In addition to claims of simple denials of access to
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participation in impact assessments, the courts hear cases on compensation for environmental
damage, challenges to rulings of the Committee of Ministers or the Executive Director of
Environmental Evaluation Service when no environmental impact assessment was conducted,
implementation of emissions or environmental quality standards, and complaints against
administrative decisions that annul environmental regulations (UNEP 2015, 108; Muñoz Gajardo
2014, 17-38). While these reforms represent moves toward wider access to justice in Chile, the
OECD notes that in reality, “the high cost of legal counsel often puts this access out of reach of
NGOs and private citizens (2016, 28).”
Analysis
These above outlined access rights are increasingly becoming the global norm in
domestic environmental governance, and, indeed, for environmental justice. Making these rights
meaningful in the Chilean case is essential since Chile ranked ninth of seventy-six countries
examined worldwide and fourth in Latin America in terms of environmental conflicts (OECD
2016, 15). Chile’s environmental conflicts overwhelmingly involve energy transmission and
mining projects. At this point, we simply note Chile’s Environmental Democracy scores from the
World Resources Institute’s Environmental Democracy Index (EDI). The country received a
score of 1.89 for “access to information” and 1.88 for “access to justice.” Both are considered
“good.” In contrast, the country received a 1.24 for “access to participation,” a score considered
only “fair” for a high-income OECD country (www.environmentaldemocracyindex.org).
To make our discussion of environmental democracy and environmental justice in Chile
more concrete, we briefly examine some major environmental struggles, the citizen groups
involved and their use of access rights, and the outcomes to date. The most notable conflicts have
taken place in indigenous territories and typically involve dam or mining projects. While Chile
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has embraced renewable, hydropower, project development has primarily targeted the country’s
southern region. An early dam project that galvanizing major opposition was Endesa’s xviii
RALCO Dam (which went into operation 2004), near Temuco in Chile’s Biobió region.
Significantly, this project was developed before the government adopted the three procedural
access rights. In hopes of preventing other projects in what became known as a watershed
conflict area, a mix of environmentalists and Mapuche rights activists formed the Citizen Action
Network for Environmental Rights (Red de Acción por los Derechos Ambientales or RADA) in
2005. In 2006, it became the Interregional Action Network for Environmental and Social Justice
(Red de Acción por la Justicia Ambiental RAJAS).
Key strategies used by the network since the mid-2000s have been to explicitly link these
environmental struggles with human rights discourses and allusions to past colonial abuses
(Urkidi and Walter 2011; Montoya 2014). This network and others that formed around other
environmental protests have used the now classic “boomerang strategy (Keck and Sikking 1998)
to successfully stop some projects but not others. It should be noted that the push for procedural
environmental access rights was, at least in part, pushed by early defeats such as the RALCO
dam.
HydroÁysen was the watershed conflict project that has received the most international
coverage and notoriety to date. This was a $10 billion project of Endesa first proposed in 2005. It
would have been the country’s largest energy project in its history consisting of five huge dams
on two rivers, the Baker and Pascua, in Patagonia. This area of South-Central Chile is not only
Mapuche territory but it is also an area renowned for its natural beauty. In return for permitting
the project on their ancestral lands, Mapuche leaders demanded the return of approximately one
million acres of territory. Ultimately, after a decade of protest, the jailing of Mapuche activists,
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and global negative publicity, the Chilean government backed away from this project in 2014.
Leaders of the NGO, Patagonia Defense Council, called the decision the greatest win for Chile’s
environmental movement, where an empowered public was allowed to participate in decisions
that affect their environment and their lives (Edwards and Roberts 2015, 56-57). xix
A final project relevant for this study is Barrick Gold’s Pascua-Lama project in the
northern part of the country. This Canadian firm, the largest gold mining company in the world
began, project negotiations in 1994 and broke ground in 1999. In 2000, Chile and Argentina
signed a treaty 2000 to allow cross-national collaboration in the mine development with 75% of
the concession on the Chilean side and 25% on the Argentine side. Project opponents cited the
normal threats associated with mining, the threat of toxic waste for the area’s water and soil and
cultural threats to Diaguita indigenous communities, In addition to these general risks, however,
were environmentalists’ special concerns about exploration and extraction in the High Andes,
potential earthquakes and threats to glaciers that provide the region’s water.
After conducting an EIA, Chile’s environmental agency at the time, CONAMA, signed
off on the project in 2006. The Diaguita (Indigenous) Agricultural Communities claimed they did
not have adequate participation in the decision including discussions for FPIC (as required by
ILO 169); and in 2007, submitted their case to the I-A Commission on Human Rights (M
Serrano 316-320). The project has been delayed for almost two decades, but in 2015, the Chilean
Environmental court gave permission for the project, now smaller and a joint - venture between
two companies, Barick and Goldcorp, to proceed.
Conclusion
The first intent of this study has been to contribute to an understanding of procedural
environmental democracy, especially to attain environmental justice; it is also meant to offer one
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framework for the comparative study of environmental politics. Studying the adoption and
implementation of procedural environmental rights and institutions at the national level, will
allow comparativists interested in these topics (information, participation, and legal remedies) to
build systematically on each other’s work. To date, comparative politics researchers have
provided hundreds if not thousands of studies on environmental issues/conflicts around the
world, but have not necessarily asked similar questions or explored similar hypotheses to build
theory. Furthermore, there is a clear overlap with International Relations and legal scholars
studying Environmental Human Rights. xx While these scholars are anchoring their work in
international human rights treaties and the growing numbers of constitutions calling for the
“right to a healthy environment,” these studies and those of comparativists can reciprocally
enrich each scholarly track.
Studying procedural environmental democracy will also allow researchers to comment on
democratic deepening, useful in the Chilean case and in other Third Wave democracies. We
asked questions here but only began to find the answers. It was only in the 2000s that
environmental and environmental justice conflicts begin to appear. It is not than
environmentally harmful activities only began at this time, but rather that after the 1990
transition, it took time for Chilean NGOs and social movements to “get up to speed.” Through
the first post-transition decade, Chilean social movements and civil society remained weak and
fragmented (Luna and Maradones, 2010, 114-15). It is, perhaps, obvious but important to
emphasize is that procedural environmental rights typically have not simply given by
governments; they are granted after years of citizens demands or when the state is being when
being incentivized by an International Organization, such as the OECD in the case of Chile. Now
that Chilean ngos and environmental movements have gained in strength, however, the main
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question is “how successful have Chilean NGOs environmental movements been in employing
the relatively recently legislated environmental access in rights in blocking or modifying projects
that might cause major environmental impact, environmental injustice, or both?”
To conclude, we have provided a potential framework for comparativists studying
environmental conflicts, including environmental justice conflicts. We have also provided what,
somewhat surprisingly, may be an optimistic case study of a country with a neoliberal ideology
that while slow in institutionalizing environmental protection and access rights, is in some ways
now a regional leader. After the Rio+20 UN Environment and Development Conference in 2012,
Chile became the lead state in pushing for an Aarhus-type Convention for the Latin American
and Caribbean region. Surely Chilean social movements employing newly-acquired access rights
explains some of the change.
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iv
In Spanish, they are called Registros de Emisiones y Transferencia de Contaminaciones (RETCs).
vv
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm.
vi
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2nd 608 (1963-1981).
vii
Much of Latin American historical analysis has focused on the role of natural resource exploitation in the colonial
era as well as in constructing modern nation states in the region (Leff 1994, Alimonda 2011).
viii
Although on paper, Chile was an innovator in the region in that its 1980 constitution gave its citizens “the right
to live in an environment free of contamination,” this right was essentially meaningless at the time, given the
military junta’s ideological approach to unbridled economic growth.
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In January 2016, Delamaza was named by Michelle Bachelet to a presidential panel, el Consejo de la
Participación Ciudadana y Fortalecimiento a la Sociedad Civil, to promote citizen participation.
xiii
(Luna and Maradones 2010, 114-115;
xiv
In a personal interview, Guiloff Titiun also expressed concern about another new environmental agency,
Servicios de Biodiversidad. The fear was that with increased natural resource-based projects and projects involving
infrastructure expansion, the cause of biodiversity protection was at risk.
xv
Also see, Costa Cordella and Fuentes Merino (2011).
xvi
CEPAL (overseeing negotiations for the LAC P10 Convention) notes similarities between the LAC regional
agreement and the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda 2030, approved in September 2015.Both emphasize the
“virtuous circle” involving access rights, environmental protection, and human rights The documents stress that
“informed participation and transparency contribute to improving environmental policies and, therefore,
environmental protection, which in turn enables compliance with substantive rights such as the right of every
person to a healthy environment, to life and health (http://negociacionp10.cepal.org 21 June 2016.”
xvii
Indigenous Chileans have had more success participating on issues such as bilingual-bicultural education rather
than on issues involving socio-environmental conflicts (Delamaza 2014).
xvii
Endesa is a subsidiary of the Italian Company, ENEL.
xviiiEdwards and Roberts offer an interesting “take” on this case that highlights the ambiguity of this case. Clearly it
was a win for environmental justice but a possible loss for climate change mitigation. Scholars must further unpack
the sometime competing virtuous policy goals of environmental justice and effective policy to combat climate.
HidroÁysen would have provided 15-20% of Chile’s energy needs. While Chile has a potential for other types of
renewable energy (solar, geothermal, and wave and tidal) it remains energy-poor and relies on imported natural
gas.
xiii
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